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[L. A. No. 22274. In Bank. Aug. 1, 1952.] 
DANIEL SCOTT, Appellant, v. HERMAN BURKE, 
Respondent. 
[L. A. No. 22275. In Bank. Aug. 1, 1952.] 
SAMUEL GERRY, Appellant, v. HERMAN BURKE, 
Respondent. 
[1] Death-Instructions-Presumptions.-Where alleged negligent 
acts and conduct of a decedent are in issue, an instruction 
that deceased is presumed to have exercised ordinary care 
for his own concerns is proper except that if the fact proved 
by uncontradicted testimony produced by the party seeking 
to invoke the presumption, under circumstances which afford 
no indication that the testimony is the product of mistake 
or inadvertence, is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption, 
the latter is dispelled and disappears from the case. 
[2] Negligence - Presumptions. - One who by reason of loss of 
memory is unable to testify concerning his conduct at and im-
mediately before the time of an accident is entitled to invoke 
the presumption that he exercised ordinary care for his own 
(2] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 122; Am.Jur., ~ egligence, § 290. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Death, § 84; [2,3] Kcgligence, § 124; 
(4, 5] Evidence, §§ 127, 140; (6] Evidence, § 136; [7) Evidence, 
§ 555(1); [8] Negligence, § 133; [9,10) Evidence, § 129; [11] Negli-
gence, §§ 124, 133; [12] Automobiles, §§ 189, 193(1); [13] Negli-
gence, § 134; [14J Automobiles, §§ 189, 193(1); Negligefi(le, §§ 124, 
133; [15] Negligence, § 1; [16) Automobiles, § 307(17). 
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concerns, subject to the exception that such presumption is dis-
pelled. by evidence introduced by such party which is wholly 
irreconcilable therewith. 
[3] Id.-Presumptions.-Presumption that a person takes ordinary 
care of his own concerns is evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957; 
see, also, §§ 1961, 1963 (1) (4) ), is sufficient to support a verdict 
unless dispelled by the "irreconcilable" fact proved by the 
party relying on it, and may outweigh positive evidence ad-
duced against it. 
[4] Evidence-Presumptions and Inferences.-Both inferences and 
presumptions are evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957), and are 
weighed by the jury with the other evidence before it. 
[5] Id.-Presumptions and Inferences.-Neither a disputable pre-
sumption nor an inference is as a matter of law entitled to 
be accorded greater weight by the trier of facts than is the 
other. 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
Id.-Presumptions and Inferences.-An inference is merely a 
pertinent deduction drawn from circumstantial evidence; i.e., 
from evidence which is circumstantial as to the fact deduced. 
Id.-Weight-Circumstantial Evidence.-Circumstantial evi-
dence may outweigh, in convincing force, both the strongest 
of disputable presumptions and direct evidence as well. 
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Res ipsa loquitur doctrine 
raises an inference of negligence, not a presumption. 
Evidence-Presumptions and Inferences.-It is for the trier 
of fact to determine under the circumstances of each case 
whether to give greater weight to an inference than to a 
disputable presumption which conflicts therewith, or vice 
versa. 
[10] Id.-Presumptions and Inferences.-When a presumption is 
controverted by other evidence, whether direct or indirect, 
an issue of fact is raised which it is the duty of the court 
to determine as in other cases, and its conclusion is conclusive 
on an appellate court unless it is manifestly without sufficient 
support in the evidence. 
[11] Negligence-Presumptions and Inferences.-Under appropri-
ate circumstances, both the res ipsa loquitur inference and 
the disputable presumptions of innocence and due care are 
elements tending towards proof to be considered by the trier 
of facts; and it is the function of the trier of facts to deter-
mine in the light of all the evidence in the case, including the 
opposing inferences and presumptions, whether the proof pre-
ponderates in favor of one party and against another, or is 
(7] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 265-266, 339, 346, 584; Oal. 
Jur., Evidence, §§ 67, 74, 373; Am.Jur., § 1189. 
(8] See Oal.Jur., Negligence, § 123; Am.Jur., Negligence, 1295. 
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flvenly halanced, and thereupon to resolve the issues in ac-
rordance with the rules relating to the burden of proof. 
(12) Automobiles-Presumptions and Inferences.-Although the al-
legedly negligent motorist in an automobile accident case 
against whom the res ipsa loquitur inference arises may by 
reason of loss of memory be unable to explain his acts and con-
duct, where it is shown that the automobile was in good condi-
tion, that he was a competent driver and had had several hours 
rest and sleep shortly before the accident, and where the 
physical evidence indicates that he, while on his side of the 
road, applied his brakes and swerved and thereafter repeatedly 
released and reapplied the brakes, thus giving rise to a per-
missible inference that he was confronted with some sudden 
emergency and was diligently endea'Voring to cope with it, 
such inference, if drawn by the jury, would be a part of the 
evidence to be by it weighed with the other evidence, both 
direct and indirect, presented by the parties. 
[13] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-One theory underlying the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that a defendant in charge of 
an instrumentality which causes injury either knows the cause 
of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining 
it, and plaintiff, having no such knowledge, is compelled to 
allege negligence in general terms and to rely on proof of 
the happening of the accident to establish it. 
[14] AutOmobiles-Presumptions and Inferences: Negligence-Pre-
sumptions and Inferences.-Where defendant offers evidence of 
his lack of memory and consequent lack of knowledge and 
of opportunity to explain the cause of an automobile acci-
dent, it is unfair to deprive him of the presumption of due 
care merely because plaintiff relies on the res ipsa loquitur 
(loctrine. (Disapproving Waite v. Pacific Gas (/,. Elee. Co., 56 
Cal.App.2d 191, 132 P.2d 311, and inconsistent implieations 
in Smith v. Hollander, 85 Cal.App. 535, 259 P. 958; Ellis v. 
Jewett, 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634-637, 64 P.2d 432; Moeller v. 
Market St. By. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 562, 567, 81 P.2d 475; and 
Pezzoni v. City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal.App.2d 
123, 225 P.2d 14.) 
[15] Negligence - Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident. - The so-
called defcnse of inevitable accident is nothing more than a 
dcnial by dt'fendnnt of negligence or a contention that his 
negligcnce, if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury. 
[16] Automobiles-Instructions-Unavoidable Accident.-In action 
for injuries resulting when automobile left highway while 
all occupants of car other than defendant driver were asleep, 
defendant's instruction on unavoidable accident is properly 
given where evidence was produced tending to show that he 
was confronted with a sudden emergency which caused him 
to apply his brakes and swerve off the highway. 
) 
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APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angelf'sConnty. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Affirmed. 
Actions for damages for injuries sustained in an automo-
bile accident. Judgment!; for defendant affirmed. 
Mark F. Jones and W. L. Engelhardt for Appellant in 
1). A. No. 22274. 
Knight, Gitelson & Ashton, Robert R. Ashton, Samuel A. 
Rosenthal and Leonard G. Ratner for Appellant in L. A. 
No. 22275. 
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and Raymond G. Stan- I 
bury ·for Respondent. 
Campbell, Hayes & Custer and W. R. Dunn, as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-These two actions for personal injuries 
arising out of the same automobile accident were consolidated 
for trial, judgments on jury verdicts were entered in defend-
ant's favor, and plaintiffs appeal. We h~ve concluded that, 
contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the jury were properly in-
structf'd and the judgments must be affirmed.1 
The uncontradicted evidence, insofar as material to these 
appeals, is as follows: At 9 o'clock p. m. on May 23, 1948, 
defendant, the two plaintiffs, and three other men left Guay-
mas, Mexico, in a 1947 Cadillac sedan belonging to plaintiff 
Gerry. The car, less than a year old, had gone only 11,000 
or 12,000 miles and was in excellent mechanical condition 
with good brakes and good tires with lifeguard inner tubes. 
The party had gone to Guaymas on a fishing trip, and had 
been sharing thc driving. Defendant drove from Guaymas 
to Hermosillo, a distance of about 87 miles. Anoth~r member 
of thf' party was at the wheel during the four hour drive 
from Hermosillo to Nogales. on the border, where they ar-
rived about 4:45 o'clock a. m. on May 24; defendant slept 
during this timf'. At Nogales defendant took over the driv-
ing again and proceeded north toward Tucson, Arizona; the 
lit should he noted that the accident occurred in the State of Arizona, 
and that de1'endant makes no contf.:1tion that Arizona haa a "guest 
statute" (see Central Copper Co. v. Klefisch (1928), 34 Ariz. 230 (270 
P. 629]), or that the California "guest lltatute" ill applicable (aee 
Loranger v. Nadeau (1932),215 Cal. 362 [10 P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. 1264]). 
) 
) 
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other members of the party fell asleep and remained sleep-
ing until after the accident occurred. About an hour after 
the group left Nogales the automobile, still driven by defend-
ant, traveled diagonally across the left half of the highway 
and off an embankment on the left side. "Skid marks" 
(according to the transcript, but from the context probably 
meaning tire marks), broken and recurrent as if the brakes 
had been repeatedly applied, released and reapplied, extended 
for a distance of 78 feet across the highway at an angle to 
the point where the car went over the embankment. At the 
site of the accident the highway was straight, level, and dry; 
it was daylight at the time and visibility was good although 
there was "a little haze." After leaving the highway the 
car traveled 114 feet to the edge of an arroyo, where there 
was a sloping bank of approximately 28 feet, at which point 
the wheel marks stopped for about 25 feet. The wheel marks 
then continued for 35 feet up the other side of the arroyo 
where the car came to a stop. It was badly wrecked and 
the parties injured. 
A police officer reached the scene about 6 :45 o'clock a. m., 
and after an investigation interviewed defendant at a hos-
pital between 8 and 9 0 'clock the same morning. The officer 
testified that defendant stated that he did not know his speed 
at the time of the accident, that he had previously been 'cravel-
ing at a reasonable and prudent speed, and that "I evi-
dently went to sleep. I don't know what happened until 
I woke up at the hospital." 
Defendant testified that he had no recollection whatsoever 
of the accident and could not explain why it occurred; that 
his first recollection thereafter was of opening his eyes be-
hind the wheel, and the last recollection he had of any event 
prior thereto was of his driving of the car between Nogales 
and Tucson; that there was very little traffic on the road 
when he took the wheel at Nogales; that he did not remember 
applying the brakes or of being interviewed by the police 
officer; that he did remember being taken to the hospital and 
arriving there; that his highest speed was 60 miles per hour; 
that in his best opinion he did not fall asleep prior to the 
accident; that he had previously driven the automobile and 
was familiar with it. Defendant was rendered temporarily 
unconscious by the accident, and suffered a concussion of the 
brain and injuries to his head. Medical testimony was in-
troduced to the effect that one who is knocked unconscious 
by a blow on the head may suffer a retrograde amnesia by 
Aug. 1952] SCOTT v. BURKE 
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which his memory of events immediately preceding his un-
conscionsness may be obliterated for a period of from a few 
seconds to a lltunber of hours, and that under such circum-
stances the injmcd person would bc unable to recall any of 
the events which happened during the period blocked out 
of his memory by such amnesia. 
Because the other persons in the car were sleeping, they 
were unable to testify as to the cause of the accident, but 
plaintiffs offered no criticism of defendant's driving while 
they wcre awake. 
Upon this evidence the court instructed the jury on the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine,2 and also instructed that if the 
jury believed that defendant as a result of the shock of the 
accident was unable to remember and testify as to his own 
conduct or other facts of the accident then a presumption 
arose that he "was obeying the law and was exercising ordi-
nary care and doing such acts as an ordinarily prudent per-
son would have done in the same circumstances." (See Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 4.) The court further instructed 
that "these instructions direct your attention to two con-
flicting rebuttable presumptions relating to the conduct of 
the defendant (one) that he exercised due care at the time 
of the accident which presumption arises in the event that 
you find that as a result thereof he is unable to remember 
the facts pertaining to the same, and (two) that he was 
negligent if you find that he was driving on the wrong side 
of the road, or that he permitted the automobile to leave 
the road in question entirely, or that he fell asleep at the 
wheel. If you find the facts to exist which give rise to these 
presumptions, then these conflicting presumptions constitute 
evidence, the effect of which is to be determined by you, not 
by the court; they are to be weighed and considered by you 
in the light of and in connection with all of the other evi-
dence, and you ere to give to them, and each of them, such 
weight as you deem proper j" and that "In determining 
'The instruction reads as follows: "From the happening of the acci· 
dent invol,ed in this case there arises an inference that the proximate 
cause of the occurrence was some negligent conduct on the part of the 
defendant. That infer('nce is a form of e,idence, and if there is none 
other tending to overthrow it, or if the inference preponderates over 
contrary e,idence, it warrants a verdict for the plaintiff. Therefore, 
you should weigh any evidence tending to overeome that inference, bear· 
ing in mind that it is incumhent upon the defendant to rebut the in· 
ference by showing that he did, in fact, exercise ordinary care and 
diligence or that the accident occurred without being proximately caused 
b;y any failure of dut;y on his part." 
) 
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what caused the accident you are entitled to take into con-
sideration the evidence of the physical facts and to draw 
reasonable inferellces therefrom." 
Plaintiffs contl:'llU that inasmuch as the res ipsa loquitur 
uoctrine is applicable (and defendant does not dispute this; 
see Druzanich v. Criley (1942), 19 Ca1.2d 439, 444 [122 P.2d 
53]) the court erred to their prejudice in instructing the 
jury as to the presumption of due care, and that the judg-
ments must therefore be reversed. 
[1] It is settled law that where alleged negligent acts 
and conduct of a decedent are at issue before the court and 
the "testimony respecting such acts and conduct necessarily 
must be produced by witnesses other than the deceased, ... 
an instruction that the deceased is presumed to have exer-
cised ordinary care for his own concerns is . . . proper" ex-
cept that if the fact proved by uncontradicted testimony pro-
duced by the party seeking to invoke the presumption, "under 
circumstances which afford no indication that the testimony I 
is the product of mistake or inadvertence . . . is wholly ir-
reconcilable with the presumption . . . the latter is dispelled 
and disappears from the case." ( Westberg v. W illde (1939), 
14 Ca1.2d 360, 365, 367 [94 P.2d 590] ; see, also, Mar Shee 
v. jrlaryland Assurance Corp. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 [210 P. 
269] ; Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co. (1931), 212 Cal. 540, 560-
561 [299 P. 529] ; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co. (1931), 
212 Cal. 36, 39 [297 P. 884J ; Mundy v. Marshall (1937), 8 
Ca1.2d 294,296 [65 P.2d 65].) [2] One who by reason of 
loss of memory is unable to testify concerning his conduct 
at and immediately before the time of the accident is en-
titled to invoke the same presumption, subject to the same 
exception. (Scott v. Sheedy (1940), 39 Cal.App.2d 96, 101 
[102 P.2d 575J ; Roselle v. Beach (1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 579, 
583 [125 P.2d 77J ; Eastman v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. By. Co. 
(1942),51 Cal.App.2d 653, 667 [125 P.2d 564] ; Fietz v. Hub-
bard (1943).59 Cal.App.2d 124, 131 [138 P.2d 315]; McNear 
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1944), 63 Cal.App.2d 11, 15 
[146 P.2d 34J ; Simon v. City &- CO'ltnty of San Francisco 
(1947), 79 Cal.App.2d 590, 598 [180 P.2d 393J; Duvall v. 
T.W.A. (1950), 98 Cal.App.2d 106, 110 [219 P.2d 463J; 
Russell v. Andersen (1951), 101 Cal.App.2d 684 [226 P.2d 
350].) [3] This disputable presumption is by statute de-
clared to be evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957; see, also, 
§§ 1961,1963(1)(4», and is sufficient to support a verdict 
of a jury unless dispelled by the "irreconcilable" fact proved 
Aug. 1952] SCOTT tJ. BURKE 
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hy the party relying on it. (Westberg v. Wmde (1939), 
~lI,pra" 14 Ca1.2d 360, 365, and cases there cited; Chakrnakjian 
\". Lowe (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 308, 313 [201 P.2d 801].) It may 
outweigh positive evidence adduced against it. (SmeZZie v. 
Southern Pac. Co. (1931), supra, 212 Cal. 540, 549, and cases 
there cited; ct. Speck v. Sar'ver (1942), 20 Ca1.2d 585, 588 
[128 P.2d 16].) 
Plaintiffs argue, however, that it is likewise settled in Cali-
fornia by a series of decisions that where, as here, defendant 
offers testimony which if believed by the jury would entitle 
defendant to benefit by the presumption of due care, it is 
nevertheless reversible error to so instruct the jury in a case 
in which plaintiff is entitled to benefit by the res ipsa loquitur 
inference. 
In Smith v. Hollander (1927), 85 Cal.App. 535 [259 P. 
958], defendant's automobile ran onto the sidewalk and struck 
plaintiff, a pedestrian. It was held that the court correctly 
instructed the jury on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and 
that (p. 540) "Where it was proper to instruct on this doc-
trine it was proper for the court to refuse defendant's re-
quested instructions . . . upon the presumption of defend-
ant's freedom from negligence." No authority is cited for 
the last-quoted statement. It appears from the opinion in 
which such statement is made that thc defendant driver her-
self there testified as to the events leading' up to the accident; 
h!'nce, the presumption of due care would have been unavail-
able to her regardless of whether res ipsa loquitur applied, 
and, upon the facts of the case, the ruling was correct. 
In Ellis v. Jewett (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634-637 [64 
P.2cl432], defendants appealed from an order granting plain-
tiff a new trial on the ground of error in the instructions. 
'fhe court had instructed on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, 
and had also told the jury that "There is a presumption in 
law that ... [defendant] was free from fault in driving 
the automobile, and this i.s a presumption which continues 
throughout the entire case, and must be comidered by you 
in deciding the issues involved in the co,~e. No presumption 
of negligence on the part of . . . r defendant] arises from the 
mere happening of the accident . . ." The court on appeal 
held that the res ipsa loquitur instruction had been proper 
and further held, without citation of authority, that the in-
struction on presumption of freedom from fault was there-
fore erroneous and prejudicial. Under the circumstances of 
that case we may assume that the ruling is correct but that 
396 SCOTT v. BURKE [39 C.2d 
does not mean that the principle must as a matter of law 
inevitably be applicable in all res ipsa loquitur situations 
regardless of other pertinent circumstances. In the cited 
opinion it does not appear that defendant driver did not 
himself testify as to the events leading up to the accident; 
moreover, the positive instruction that there was a presump-
tion of freedom from fault and that it "continues through-
out the entire case," obviously states a proposition much 
more strongly and positively phrased in favor of defendant 
than does the instruction given in the instant case, to the 
effect that the due care presumption arose only if the jury 
believed that defendant was unable to remember and testify 
concerning the accident. 
In Moeller v. Market St. Ry. Co. (1938),27 Cal.App.2d 562, 
567 [81 P.2d 475], a streetcar started while plaintiff, a pas-
senger, was alighting. Judgment was entered on a verdict 
in plaintiff's favor, and on appeal by defendant it was held, 
in reliance on Smith v. Hollander (1927), supra, 85 Cal.App. 
535, that "An instruction that the law presumes that the 
carmen used the requisite care and acted as reasonably pru-
dent persons was properly refused as the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur raised an inference of negligence." In this 
case also, however, both the conductor and the motorman 
of the streetcar testified concerning the accident, and there 
was therefore no ba~is for reliance by defendants on the due 
care presumption regardless of the application of the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
In Waite v. Pacific Gas &; Elec. Co. (1942), 56 Ca1.App. 
2d 191 [132 P.2d 311], plaintiff was injured by a fall re-
sulting from a sudden jerk of the streetcar on which she 
was 'a passenger. The car ,vas operated by only one man, 
who died prior to the trial. No witness to the accident other 
than plaintiff was produced. On defendant's appeal from 
a judgment for plaintiff, following a jury trial, it was held 
that the jury was correctly instructed on the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine, and that therefore (in reliance upon Smith v. Hol-
lander (1927), supra, and Moeller v. Market St. Ry. Co. 
(1938), supra, defendant was not entitled to instructions on the 
presumption of due care. The court comments (p. 202), 
"The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur raises 
an inference of negligence against the defendant. It would 
be contradictory ... also to instruct the jury there is a 
preflumption the drfendant acted with due care." 
) 
) 
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In Pezzoni v. City (~ County of San Francisco (1950), 101 
Cal.App.2d 123, 124: [225 P.2d 14], plaintiff, a streetcar pas-
senger, was injured when the ear "stopped with a sudden 
jerk. " The jury found for defendants, and the trial court 
granted a new trial "on the ground of errors of law occur-
ring at the trial." The jury had been instructed on both 
res ipsa loquitur and the due care presumption. On appeal 
by defendant the court commented that "The jury was thus 
faced with the metaphysical responsibility of weighing a 
presumption of care against an inference of negligence. The 
courts haye held that in a res ipsa case it it not proper to 
give an instruction on the presumption of care. [Citing the 
Smith, Moeller, and \Vaite cases, sttpra.]" The holding was 
that because instructions had been given on both res ipsa 
loquitur and the presumption of due care, as well as be-
cause of other errors in the instructions, the trial court had 
acted within its discretion in granting the new trial. In 
this cited case, again, there is no suggestion that defendant 
claimed the existence of facts (death or loss of memory on 
the part of the operators of the streetcar) which would en-
title it to the instruction as to the presumption of due care. 
Assuming that the aboye cited and discussed decisions of 
the District Court of Appeal actually set forth the view con-
tended for by the plaintiffs,3 which would deny to a party 
in a civil action (whether plaintiff or defendant) against 
whom the res ipsa loquitur inference is applicable the benefit 
of the presumptions of due care and of innocence, where an 
otherwise acceptable basis for those presumptions has been 
established, we nevertheless conclude that sound considera-
tions of law, logic and justice unite with impelling force 
against our acceptance and perpetuation of that view. 
[4] In California both inferences and presumptions are 
by statute declared to be evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957), 
and are weighed by the jury with the other evidence before 
it. [5] Of the two, neither a presumption (disputable)' 
nor an inference is as a matter of law entitled to be ac-
corded greater weight by the trier of facts than is the other. 
'Waite v. Pacific Gas 4' Elec. Co. (1942), supra, 56 Cal.App.2d 191, 
appears to be the only one which upon its facts squarely presents the 
basis for the bolding. 
'Section 1961 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that •• A pre-
sumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be contro-
verted by other evidence, direct or indirect; but unless so controverted 
the jury are bound to find according to the presumption." 
) 
) 
/ 
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Any suggestion that a disputable presumption, merely as 
such, has greater weight than an inference is an erroneous 
concept. Thus. while an inference is defined in section 1958 
of the Code of Civil Procedure as "a deduction which the 
reason of the jury makes from the facts proved, without an 
express directioll of law to that effect," and a presumption 
is declared to be "a deduction which the law expressly directs 
to be made from particular facts" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1959), 
there is no pro\'ision of law which requires that a disputable 
presumption mnst be accorded greater weight than the rea-
son of the fact trier suggests should be given to an opposing 
inference. [6] Actually, an inference is nothing more nor 
less than a pertinent deiluction drawn from circumstantial 
evidence; i.e., from eYirlel1ce which is circumstantial as to 
the fact deduceil. [7] And circumstantial evidence may 
outweigh, in convincing force, both the strongest of disputable 
presumptions (soml'times said to be the presumption of inno-
cence; see discussion and cases cited in 8 Cal.Jur. pp. 190-
192, §§ 265-266; and p. 279, § 339; pp. 290-291, § 346 ; p. 593, 
§ 584; 10 CaLJur. 754, 762-764; People v. Shorts (1948), 32 
Cal.2d 502, 507 [197 P.2d 330J) and direct evidence as well 
(Gmy v. Southern Pac. Co. (1944), 23 Ca1.2d 632, 641 [145 
P.2d 561] ; see 10 CaLTur. 1157-1158, and cases there cited). 
[8] The res ipsa loquitur doctrine raises "an inference 
of negligence, not a presumption." (Anderson v. I. M. Jame-
son Corp. (1936),7 Ca1.2d 60,66 [59 P.2d 962J.) [9] How-
ever, just as either an inference or a presumption may out- I 
weigh positive evidence adduced against it by the opposing 
party, so may either outweigh the other; i.e., it is for the 
tric>r of fact to oetl'rmine under the circumstances of each 
('ase whether to give greater weight to an inference than to 
a disputable presumption which con:fl.icts therewith, or vice 
Yersa. [10] Although disputable presumptions have some-
times been characterized as "the weakest and least satis-
factory charactc>r of evidence" nevertheless, as hereinabove 
indicatf'rl. "When [a presumption is] controverted by other 
evidence, whether <1irect or indirect, an issue of fact is raised 
which it is the rlnty of the court to determine as in other 
cases, anrl its conclusion is conclusive upon an appellate court 
unless it is manifestly without sufficient support in the evi-
dence (Fanning v. Green (1909), 156 Cal. 279 [282] [104 
P.308])." (Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928), 
20!) Cal. 252, 258 [270 P. 672] ; see, also, Smell1'e v. Southern 
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Pac. 00. (1931), supra, 212 Cal. 540, 549, and cases there 
citrd.) [11] Thus, it may be stated as a legal concept that 
it was for the jury, in the light of all the circumstances 
of the case in evidence before them, to determine whether 
greater weight should be given to the res ipsa loquitur in-
ference or to the presumptions of innocence and due care 
which conflicted with such inference. More accurately what 
that legal concept means-and exactly what its application 
in the instant caseli means-is this: That under appropriate 
circumstances, such as appear in this case, both the res ipsa 
loquitur inference and the dispntable presumptions of inno-
cence and due care are elements tending towards proof to 
be considered by the trier of facts; and that it is the func-
tion of the trier of facts to determine in the light of all the 
evidence in the case, including the opposing inferences and 
presumptions, whether the proof preponderates in favor of 
one party and against another, or is evenly balanced, and 
thereupon to resolve the issues in accordance with the rules 
relating to the burden of proof. 
Plaintiffs, in further argument against the availability of 
the innocence-due care presumptions in any case wherein a 
party is entitled to the res ipsa loquitur inference, cite Dru-
zanich v. Oriley (1942), supra, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 444, and sim-
ilar casps. From Druzanich they quote in part as follows: 
"The application of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] does 
not give a plaintiff an absolute right to a judgment in every 
easf'. [Citations.l It does not shift the burden of proof, 
and when the defendant proiluces eviilence to rebut the in-
ferencf' of negligence, it is ordinarily a question of fact 
whether the inference has been dispelled. [Citations.] How-
rver, the trier of fact cannot arbitrarily disregard the in-
ference. As stated in Ales v. Ryan (1936), 8 Ca1.2d 82, 99 
r64 P.2d 409] : 'The rule is well settled by a multitude of 
ilrrisions of the appellate courts of this state to the effect 
that the inference of negligence which is created by the 
rille res ipsa loquitu,r is in itself evidence which may not 
be disregariled by the jury and which in the absence of any 
othrr evidence as to negligence, necrssitates a verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff. It is incumbent on the defendant to rebut 
the prima facie case so created by showing that he used the 
"Inasmuch as the two eases disposed of by this opinion were consoli· 
,lnt('d for trial and for argument on appeal they are sometimes referred 
to h('rein liS a single ease. 
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care required of him under the circumstances. The burden 
is cast upon the defendant to meet or overcome the prima 
facie case made against him.''' Judgment for the defendant 
was reversed. In reaching its conclusion the court pointed 
out that defendant herself gave testimony which indicated a 
lack of due care on her part and completely failed to rebut 
the inference of negligence. By contrast, defendant in the 
instant case offered testimony which, if believed by the jury, 
entitled him to an instruction on the due care and innocence 
presumptions and to have such presumptions weighed by the 
jury together with the other evidence in the case. Clearly, 
the Druzanich case (and the same is true as to the similar 
cited cases) is not authority to the contrary. 
[12] Neither does reason suggest a contrary holding. That 
a portion of the evidence may consist of the inference of negli-
gence which arises under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine would i 
not seem to present an insurmountable obstacle to the jury 
in reaching its verdict. Although the aUf'gedly negligent party 
against whom the res ipsa inference arises may by reason 
of death or loss of memory be himself unable to explain his 
acts and conduct, it will rarely if ever occur that other evi-
dence of pertinent circumstances such 8S events occnrring 
before the accident, as well as of conditions as they are 
fOlmd to exist thereafter, will not be available for presenta-
tion to and consideration by the jury. Thus, in the prell-
ent case, it was shown that tbe automobile waR in good 
condition, tbat the defendant was a competent driver, was 
familiar with the car, had been driving carefully and had 
bad several hours rest and sleep shortly before the accident; 
furtbermore, the physical evidence indicates that defendant 
driver while on his own side of the road applied his brakes 
and swerved, and thereafter repeatedly released and reapplied 
the brakes, thus giving rise to a permissible inference that 
he was confronted with some sudden emergency and was 
diligently endeavoring to cope with it; snch inference, if 
drawn by the jnry, would be a part of the evidence to be 
by it wei!,l"hed with the other evidence, both direct and indi-
rect, presented by the parties. 
It is also to be noted that j1l1'ies are frequently con-
frontl'd with the necessity of deciding as to the truth or 
falsity of directly conflicting storiell related by the witnesses 
before them. yet it would RCllrcely be snggested that the 
production by one party of positive testimony in his own 
favor would preclude his opponent from relying upon eontra-
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dictory testimony, merely because the jury might find diffi-
culty in weighing the evidence and reaching a verdict. 
[13] Moreover, one of the theories underlying the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur, and a factor in determining whether 
it should be available in a case such as this, is the proposition 
that "a defendant in charge of an instrumentality which 
causes injury either knows the cause of the accident or has 
the best opportunity of ascertaining it, and the plaintiff, 
having no such knowledge, is compelled to allege negligence 
in general terms and to rely upon proof of the happening 
of the accident in order to establish it. [Citations.]" (See 
Leet v. Union Pac. R. 00. (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 605, 619 [155 
P.2d 42, 158 A.L.R. 1008] ; Anderson v. I. M. Jameson Oorp. 
(1936), supra, 7 Ca1.2d 60, 64, the latter quoting from Ken-
ney v. Antonetti (1931), 211 Cal. 336, 339 [295 P. 341}.) 
[14] Where, as here, defendant offers evidence of his lack 
of memory and consequent lack of knowledge and of oppor-
tunity to explain the cause of the accident, it would appear 
unfair to deprive him of the presumption of due care merely 
because plaintiff relies on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The 
contrary holding in Waite v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 00. (1942), 
Sllpra, 56 Cal.App.2d 191, and inconsistent implications in 
Smith v. Hollander (1927), supra, 85 Cal.App. 535; Ellis 
v. Jewett (1937), supra, 18 CaJ.App.2d 629, 634-637; Moeller 
v. Market St. Ry. 00. (1938), supra, 27 Cal.App.2d 562, 567; 
and Pezzoni v. Oity & 001tnty of San Francisco (1950), supra, 
]01 Cal.App.2d 123, are disapproved. 
Plaintiffs' further contention that the evidence fails to 
support the verdicts is untenable, since the presumptions 
of due care and of innocence, as noted hereinabove, constitute 
sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. 
[15, 16] Finally. plaintiffs urge that it was error to give 
defendant's requested instruction on unavoidable accident. 
However, " ... the so-called defense of inevitable accident 
is nothing more than a denial by defendant of negligence or 
a contention that his negligence, if any, was not the proxi-
mate caUfle of the injury." (Parker v. Womack (1951), 37 
Ca1.2d 116. 120-121 [230 P.2d 823], quoting from Polk v. 
Oity of Lo.~ Angeles (1945), .26 Ca1.2d 519, 542-543 [159 
P.2d 9311.) Dpfendant does deny negligence in the present 
case, pvidence wa.c; prodncpd tending to show that he was 
confrontpd with' a sudden emergency which causeq him to 
apply his brakrs and swerve off the highway, and the in-
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struction complained of properly submitted to the jury the 
law applicable upon this tenable view of the evidence. 
For the reasons above stated the judgments are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
'rRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The facts and issues in these cases are simple and could 
easily have been presented to the jury in an intelligible man-
ner. The record aptly illustrates how much confusion and 
prejudice can result when presumptions and inferences are 
regarded as evidence and a presumption is invoked against 
the party who already has the burden of proving that the 
presumed fact does not exist. (See dissenting opinion in 
Speck v. Sarver, 20 Ca1.2d 585, 590 (128 P.2d 16].) 
The automobile in which plaintiffs were riding veered from 
the right to the left side of the highway and crashed into 
the bank of a ravine. Plaintiffs were asleep at the time, and 
defendant driver testified that he had no memory of the oc-
currence. The automobile was in excellent condition before 
the accident, and skid marks indicated that the brakes were 
applied while it was still on the right side of the highway. 
To recover judgment it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to 
prove that the accident resulted from defendant's negligence 
in operating the vehicle. To discharge this burden plain-
tiffs were entitled to rely upon the inference of negligence 
arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur based on the 
fact that properly driven automobiles do not ordinarily 
leave the highway. (Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 
445 [122 P.2d 53].) 
"An inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a 
material fact that a jury may properly draw from the exist-
ence of certain primary facts." (Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d 
457, 460 [126 P.2d 868].) Unless the facts are such that 
only one inference may reasonably be drawn therefrom, it 
is ordinarily for the jury to determine in a particular case 
what inference, if any, should be drawn. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1958; Blank v. Coffin, supra, at p. 461.) If the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur is to be treated as one dealing with no 
more than a certain type of circumstantial evidence, the in-
ference arising thereunder should be treated like any other, 
and even in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the jury 
should be compelled to draw it only if reasonable minds could 
not differ. 
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If, however, the facts arc peculiarly within the knowledge 
of one of thl' parties, or a special relationship exists between 
them, there may be rl'ason to require of defendant an ex-
planation if he is to escape judgment against him. "Thus, 
when bailed goods are lost or destroyed, it is reasonable to 
require the bailee to prove that the loss was not owing to 
his negligence. (George v. Bekins Van «t Storage Co., 33 
Cal.2d 834, 839-841 [205 P.2d 1037].) Again, when a carrier 
has undertaken to carry a passenger safely it is reasonable 
to enforce that duty by requiring the carrier to explain an 
accident. (See Prosser, Res Ipsa Loq'lJitur in California, 
37 Cal.L.Rev. 183, 185.) The relationship between an un-
conscious patient and those who have undertaken to treat 
him may also be one that justifies placing the burden of proof 
on the attendants if they are to escape liability for an un-
usual injury inflicted while the patient is unconscious." (Raber 
v. Tumin, 36 Ca1.2d 654, 664 [226 P.2d 574], dissent.) Since 
in the ordinary case where an automobile leaves the high-
way, the driver will be the person best able to explain why 
the accident happened, it is not unfair to give the res ipsa 
loquitur inference arising under such circumstances the ad-
ditional procedural effect accorded to a presumption and direct 
the jury to find defendant negligent if he fails to make any 
explanation. (See Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 445 
[122 P.2d 53] ; Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 490 [154 
P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258] ; Dierman v. Providenc.e Hospital, ! 
31 Ca1.2d 290, 295 r188 P.2d 12].) 
In the present case, however, defendant introduced evi-
dence that he was in no better position than plaintiffs to ex-
plain the accident. If the jury should believe this evidence, 
it would be unfair to give to the inference arising under the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the procedural effect of a pre-
sumption, for the only justification for so doing would have 
disappeared from the case. On the other hand, the fact that 
defendant through no fault of his own may be unable to 
explain the accident in no way weakens whatever probative 
value the evidence of the happening of the accident and the 
surrounding circumstances may have. The jury should still 
be at liberty to draw the inference of negligence if it sees fit. 
Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed to find 
defendant liable if it concluded that he had the ability to 
explain the accident and failed to do so. It should also have 
bet>n instructed that if it found that defendant had no memory 
of the accident because of amnesia, it should base its verdict 
/ 
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solely on the evidence presented and find defendant liable 
only if it concluded that the accident was more probably 
than not the result of negligence on his part. Under such 
instructions the mental processes involved in reaching a ver-
dict would not have been difficult. If the jury disbelieved 
defendant's evidence that he was suffering from amnesia, his 
liability would be established. If it believed that evidence, 
it would then have to decide only whether or not to draw the 
inference from the occurrence of the accident and the sur-
rounding circumstances that defendant was negligent. If 
it could not decide whether or not to draw that inference 
it would find for defendant because of plaintiffs' failure to 
discharge their burdcn of proof. 
Instead the jury was presented with a hopelessly confus-
ing task. After instructing the jury on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur and the presumption of due care the court 
stated: "These instructions direct your attention to two con-
flicting rebuttable presumptions relating to the conduct of 
the defendant (one) that he exercised due care at the time 
of the accident which presumption arises in the event that 
you find that as a result thereof he is unable to remember 
the facts pertaining to the same, and (two) that he was negli-
gent if you find that he was driving on the wrong side of 
the road, or that he permitted the automobile to leave the 
road in question entirely, or that he fell asleep at the wheel. 
If you find the facts to exist which give rise to these pre-
sumptions, then these conflicting presumptions constitute evi-
dence, the effect of which is to be determined by you, not 
by the court; they are to be weighed and considered by you 
in the light of and in connection with aU of the other evi-
dence, and you are to give to them, and each of them, such 
weight as you deem proper." 
How could the jury understand this instruction in which 
new evidence is spontaneously generated f By what mental 
process could it weigh these rules of law or logic against 
the facts upon which it was told they were based f The 
jury might conceivably make some sense out of the part of 
the instruction that the presumption of negligence was evi-
dence. That presumption or inference has a logical basis. 
The jury could understand that a presumption or inference 
of negligence might be drawn from the fact that the auto-
mobile left the highway. It might divine, from the instruc-
tion that this presumption constituted evidence that it should 
weigh, that the court was conveying only the idea that in 
/ 
) 
) 
Aug. 1952] SCOTT 1). BURKE 
[39 C.2d 388; 247 P.2d 313) 
405 
its deliberations the jury should keep in mind that BOme 
of the evidence would support an inference of negligence, 
and that in arriving at a conclusion it should consider that 
inference as a definite possibility. 
When the jury turned to a consideration of the presump-
tion of due care, however, it would find it impossible to apply 
any such reasoning as it might have applied to the presump-
tion of negligence. Here it would see that there was no 
rational relationship between defendant's amnesia and his 
due care. The proposition that defendant had amnesia does 
not lead to the conclusion that he exercised due care. Ac-
cordingly, the jury could not assume that when the court 
described the presumptions as evidence, it intended only to . 
call tlte jury's attention to the various logical inferences it 
might draw from the evidence. It could assume only that 
it must consider two new items of conflicting evidence whose i 
nature it could not understand. 
How then would it weigh this substituted evidence t These 
presumptions were not witnesses whose demeanor might be 
observed. The facts upon which they were based were not! 
in conflict, so the jury could not look to them to determine . 
which presumption was superior. It might in desperation 
conclude that the two presumptions cancelled each other, leav-
ing neither evidence of negligence from the occurrence of 
the accident nor evidence of defendant's due care. Its mind 
now a blank, the jury would remember the instruction that 
the burden of proof was upon plaintiffs and, acocrdingly, 
return a verdict for defendant. Herein lies the vice of in-
strncting the jUl'y that a presumption exists that operates 
against the party having the burden of proof, and that the 
presumption constitutes evidence. 
Upon plaintiffs rested the burden of proving that it was 
more probable than not that the accident was caused by de-
fpndant's negligence. That burden was enlarged by the in-
struction that there was a presumption of due care and that 
the presumption was evidence. Plaintiffs were thus placed 
under· the burden. not only of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that defendant was negligent, but also of 
somehow dispelling arlditional ·i'evidence" that the jury could 
not rationally ('val}latf'. This additional burden was placed 
upon plaintiffs solely because defendant was unable to re-
member what happened. It is true· that any disparity be-
tween the parties with respect to their" sources of inforina-
tionmay"justify placing the burden of proof oil one rathet 
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than the other or creating a presumption in favor of the 
party with the burden of proof. Thus if the burden had 
been upon defendant to prove that he was not negligent, 
his inability to present evidence because of his amnesia might 
justify a presumption in his favor that he was exercising 
due care. Similarly, in jurisdictions where the burden is 
upon the plaintiff to prove that he was not guilty of con-
tributory negligcnce, it is not unfair to create a presump-
tion in his favor, if he is dead or otherwise unable to testify. 
In this case, however, defendant received all the procedural 
protection to which he was entitled when the burden of proof 
was placed upon plaintiffs. There is no general rule of law 
that the quantum of proof required of the party bearing 
the burden of proof increases beyond the usual preponder-
ance of probabilities because his opponent happens to be 
ignorant of the facts. Even if one assumed the wisdom of 
such a rule, its operation should be explained' to the jury 
in an intelligible manner. The jury should be instructed, 
not that there is a presumption that is evidence, but that 
because of defendant's inability to testify they should de-
mand of plaintiffs a higher degree of proof. But should 
plaintiffs be required to proye their case by clear and eon-
vincing evidence or even beyond a reasonable doubt' Clearly, 
no such burden could in justice be imposed upon plaintiffs 
in this case. They were in no better position than defendant 
was to explain the accident. There was no danger that they 
might fabricate testimony that defendant would be helpless 
to refute. The evidence with respect to the accident was 
fonnd only in the physical facts. Plaintiffs were entitled 
to have the jury consider those facts and then decide, un-
hampered by any presumption against them, whether it was 
more probable than not that defendant's negligence caused 
the accident. The evidence of defendant's amnesia was of 
course properly in the case. If believed, it served to prevent 
a directed verdict for plaintiffs on the basis of res ipsa loqui-
tur. By showing why defendant could not explain the acci-
dent, it prevented the jury from inferring from his silence 
that if he spoke he would confess his case. 
I would reverse the judgments. 
Edmonds, .T., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
While I agree, generally, with the views expressed in the 
majority opinion with respect to the law appliCJl.bJe to ju-
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ferences and presumptions, it was error, in my opinion, to 
give an instruction on unavoidable accident. My views with 
respect to instructions of this character are set forth in my 
dissent in Parker v. Womack, 37 Cal.2d 116, 123 [230 P.2d 
823]. A.nyone familiar with the trial of personal injury 
cases can appreciate the prejudicial effect of such an in-
struction in a case of this type, and I would, therefore, re-
verse the judgment on this ground. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied A.ugust 28, 
1952. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
